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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF ) 
THE ADOPTION OF: ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) Case No. 87-0415CA 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-
2a-3(2)(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard H. 
Moffat presiding, reversing the ruling of Judge Michael R. Murphy 
and allowing the natural mother of infant anonymous to revoke her 
consent to the adoption of the child and dismissing the 
appellant' s petition for adoption. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Once a district court judge has held that consent is 
voluntary, pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-30-8 (1987), can another district court judge reverse 
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that decision and allow consent to be revoked upon the grounds 
that it was not voluntary? 
2. May a trial court permit a party to revoke consent to 
adoption, given in open court, based upon the consenting party' s 
unilateral mistake? 
3. In the face of conflicting affidavits, may a trial 
court, without holding an evidentiary hearing, grant a motion for 
revocation of consent to an adoption upon the grounds that the 
consent was not voluntarily given. 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-8 (1987): 
Procedure - Agreement of adopting parents. The person 
adopting a child and the child adopted, and the other 
persons whose consent is necessary, must appear before 
the district court of the county where the person 
adopting resides, and the necessary consent must 
thereupon be signed and an agreement be executed by the 
person adopting to the effect that the child shall be 
adopted and treated in all respects as his own lawful 
child; provided, that if a person whose consent is 
necessary is not within the county the court may, in 
the same manner as is or may be provided for the taking 
of depositions in civil cases, appoint a commissioner 
to examine such person upon his deposition and to take 
his written consent and to certify the same to the 
court. The commissioner shall explain to such person 
the legal significance of such consent, and shall 
certify to the court his findings as to whether or not 
the consent is freely given. Where such person is 
within the state of Utah the commission shall issue to 
a judge of the district court of the county in which 
such person is located. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Infant anonymous was born on June 23, 1987, at 4: 19 am. (R. 
116; Addendum "A" at p. 2)1 On or about March 31, 1987, 
approximately three months prior to the child' s birth, the 
natural mother (the "respondent") visited the Utah Women's Health 
Center to "determine the duration of her then-existing 
pregnancy." (R. 41; Addendum "B" at p.2 paragraph 4) Thereafter, 
Susan Bagley, a counselor at the Utah Women' s Health Center, 
counseled respondent extensively "respecting her decision to 
place her child for adoption." (R. 41; Addendum "B" at p 2 
paragraph 5) At no time did she advocate adoption over the other 
alternatives available to respondent. (R. 41; Addendum " B" at p. 
2 paragraph 6) During the course of the counseling, respondent 
remained resolute in her desire to place the child for adoption. 
(R. 41-42; Addendum " B" at p. 2-3 paragraphs 7 & 8) Dr. Cynthia 
Jones, respondent' s obstetrician, also informed respondent of her 
options with regard to the pregnancy, including the option of 
retaining the child, without advocating any of the alternatives. 
Copies of the portions of the court' s record of central 
importance are attached to this brief as addenda. Thus, the 
facts set forth in this brief are cited both to the court' s 
record and to the addendum in which that part of the record is 
reproduced. In the interest of preserving the confidentiality of 
the parties' identities, the names of the parties, which may be 
found in several of the documents in the court record, have been 
concealed in the copies attached in the addenda. 
2 
Susan Bagley is the Assistant Director of the Utah 
Women' s Health Center. She has a bachelor of science degree in 
Behavioral Science and Health and specializes in counseling 
pregnant women about various matters including the decision to 
place a child for adoption. (R. 41; Addendum " B" at p. 1 
paragraph 2) 
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(R. 48; Addendum " C" at p. 2 paragraphs 3 & 6) Although she 
habitually notes any sign of hesitancy on the part of a woman who 
has indicated a desire to place a child for adoption, the 
doctor' s records do not reflect, nor does she recall, that 
respondent ever demonstrated any reluctance whatsoever about her 
decision to place her child for adoption. (R. 48; Addendum "C 
at p. 2 paragraphs 7-10). 
After it became apparent that the respondent' s decision was 
final, Ms. Bagley and respondent made an appointment to consult 
with Lincoln W. Hobbs, former attorney for the adoptive parents 
(the "petitioners"), to discuss the possibility of a private 
adoption. That meeting took place on June 5, 1987 at 
approximately 11:00 a.m. (R. 42; Addendum " B" at p. 3 paragraph 9) 
During the meeting, Mr. Hobbs informed the respondent that he was 
the attorney for the adoptive parents and that if she had a legal 
question she should direct it to her own counsel as he had a 
conflict of interest in advising her of her legal rights. (R. 42; 
Addendum " B" at p. 3 paragraph 10a) Mr. Hobbs also informed 
respondent that she would have to sign a consent to the adoption 
in front of a judge and that, after she signed the consent her 
rights to the infant would be irrevocably terminated. (R. 42; 
Addendum " B" at p. 3 paragraph 10b) After that meeting, Ms. 
Bagley had several conversations with respondent in which they 
discussed the finality of her decision to relinquish her rights 
to the child. (R. 42; Addendum " B" at p. 3 paragraph 11) 
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During labor, respondent repeatedly stated that she wished 
that she could have the baby and return home to her "normal" 
lifestyle; she wavered as to whether she wanted to see the baby 
after the delivery or even know its sex. (R. 43; Addendum " B" at 
p. 4 paragraph 13) At no time did she express reservations about 
her desire to place the child for adoption. (R. 43; Addendum " B" 
at p. 4. paragraph 14. ) 
On June 24, 1987, approximately thirty hours after the 
child' s birth, respondent, Ms. Bagley and Mr. Hobbs met at the 
Third Judicial District Court for the purpose of executing the 
consent to adoption in the manner proscribed by Utah Code Ann, 
Section 70-30-8 (1987). (R. 43; Addendum " B" at p. 4 paragraph 
15) Prior to the hearing, Mr. Hobbs provided respondent with a 
copy of the Affidavit Relinquishing Parental Rights and 
Consenting to Adoption and asked her to review the document, 
which she did. (R. 43; Addendum "B" at p. 4 paragraphs 16-17) 
Judge Michael R. Murphy presided over the hearing on 
Consent to Adoption. Mr. Hobbs opened by noting that he had 
provided respondent with a copy of the affidavit relinquishing 
her parental rights and that she had indicated that she 
understood the document. (R. 117; Addendum "A" at p. 3). 
Respondent was sworn and, under oath, testified that she had read 
the affidavit and that she believed that the best interests of 
the child would be served if she relinquished any parental rights 
and consented to the adoption because she could not financially 
support the child. (R. 117; Addendum "A" at p. 3) Judge Murphy 
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then asked respondent: "Do you understand -- for want of a better 
word -- the finality of this? That if it goes forward, that your 
relinquish all parental rights forever." Respondent replied "Yes, 
I do." (R. 117; Addendum "A" at p. 3) Respondent further 
testified that she acted freely, and voluntarily, without force 
from anyone and in accord with her "own decision." (R. 117; 
Addendum "A" at p. 3) She testified that she had seen the child 
and that it did not impact upon the fact that she had "decided 
all along to have this adoption go through. " Respondent 
reiterated that she understood "there [would] not be any further 
rights" for her. Judge Murphy, apparently convinced, 
acknowledged her statement. (R. 117-18; Addendum "A" at pp. 3-4) 
Mr. Hobbs then asked the respondent if she was under the 
influence of any drugs that would impair her ability to make a 
knowing consent. She replied that she was not. (R. 118; Addendum 
"A" at p. 4) Respondent further assured Judge Murphy that she was 
only on medication for her stitches and that it did not interfere 
with her ability to know and understand what she was doing. (R. 
118-19; Addendum "A" at pp. 4-5). This fact was confirmed by 
respondent' s doctor, who noted that respondent had not been 
prescribed any medication that would have impaired her ability to 
make an informed decision about the consent at the time of the 
hearing. (R. 48; Addendum " C" at p 2 paragraph 5. ) 
Respondent was then permitted to execute the Affidavit 
Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption (the 
"Affidavit". The Affidavit states: 
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I hereby relinquish all of my parental rights which 
exist to and with Infant Anonymous. . . and I expressly 
consent to the adoption of the child by persons 
appearing before the Court, with full knowledge that by 
so doing I forfeit each and every right which might 
otherwise exist with reference to the custody and 
parental relationship of the child. 
(R. 9; Addendum ,f D" at p. 2 paragraph 4) In the Affidavit, 
respondent further attests that she has read the document and 
fully understands the impact of its terms. (R. 9; Addendum "D" 
at p. 2 paragraph 5). 
On the same day that the Affidavit was signed, the 
petitioners filed their Petition For Leave To Adopt and For 
Temporary Custody. (R. 2-5; Addendum " E" ) Having reviewed the 
Petition and witnessed the signing of the Affidavit, Judge Murphy 
held that the consent of the mother had been given in accordance 
with the Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-8 and specifically found 
that: 
the [respondent's] consent was given with the knowledge 
that by the execution of the consent she thereupon 
relinquished all parental rights as well as parental 
responsibilities in and to the child. 
(R. 7; Addendum "F" at p. 2 paragraph 3). Consequently, Judge 
Murphy granted temporary custody to the adoptive parents and the 
child was released from Holy Cross Hospital to their custody. (R. 
6-7; Addendum "F" ) 
Several days after signing the Affidavit, respondent 
contacted Ms. Bagley and stated that she had spoken with her 
mother, who had been ignorant of respondent' s pregnancy. 
3 
Respondent was over 18 years old at all times relevant to 
this appeal. (R. 41; Addendum " B" at p. 2 paragraph 4. ) 
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Respondent' s mother had, apparently, expressed reservations about 
respondent's decision to place the child for adoption. 
Consequently, respondent informed Ms. Bagley that she had 
"changed her mind" about her consent to the adoption. (R. 45; 
Addendum "B" at p. 6 paragraph 23) 
On July 22, 1987 respondent filed a Motion "pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an Order 
setting aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Adoption and allowing the [respondent] to withdraw her consent 
to the adoption." (R. 11; Addendum "G") In support of that 
Motion, respondent submitted an Affidavit stating that she should 
be allowed to withdraw her consent because, at the time she gave 
the consent, she was under the influence of pain medication and 
so weakened by the childbirth that she was left "without 
sufficient will and strength to properly evaluate the matter. " 
(R. 22; Addendum "H" at paragraph 3) Respondent further alleged 
that she was "informed and believed" that the consent was not 
final for six months and that she had that period of time in 
which to change her mind. (R. 22; Addendum "H" at paragraph 6) In 
opposition to the respondent' s Motion, the petitioners submitted 
the affidavits of Susan Bagley and Dr. Jones, which are attached 
hereto as addenda "B" and "C" respectively. 
The respondent' s Motion came on for hearing on August 31, 
1987, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. The court's 
Minute Entry, filed September 1, 1987, recites Judge Moffat's 
ruling that the respondent "did not freely and voluntarily given 
- 8 -
[sic] an unconditional release of her parental rights." (R. 57; 
Addendum "I" at p. 2). Judge Moffat supported his conclusion 
with two findings. First Judge Moffat expressed his belief that 
the language found in the transcript of the hearing before Judge 
Murphy, specifically, the fact that Judge Murphy asked the 
respondent if she understood that "if it goes forward" she 
relinquished her parental rights forever, supported the 
respondent' s allegation that she believed that she had six 
months in which to revoke her consent. (R. 57; Addendum "I" at p. 
2). Next, Judge Moffat noted that he was "impressed by the fact 
that the natural mother did not consult with members of the 
family, including her own mother, until after the birth of the 
child, but was consulted only by a counselor at the Utah Women' s 
Health Center." (R. 57; Addendum "I" at p. 2) Consequently, Judge 
Moffat ordered that custody of the child be returned to the 
respondent. (R. 58; Addendum "I" at p. 3) Shortly thereafter, Mr. 
Hobbs withdrew as counsel for the petitioners and David S. 
Dolowitz entered his appearance. (R. 60 & 62) 
The petitioners filed a Motion for Stay of Judge Moffat' s 
Order and a Protective Motion for New Trial on the basis that the 
court had erred in setting aside the consent given in front of, 
and accepted by, another district court and in ruling upon the 
conflicting affidavits submitted by the parties without holding 
an evidentiary hearing. (R. 66-68) 
The petitioners' Motions were heard by Judge Moffat on 
September 23, 1987. The court denied the Motions on the basis 
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that neither party had initially "expressed a desire to have the 
judge who took the consent hear the matter" nor requested an 
evidentiary hearing. (R. 87-88; Addendum "J") 
Petitioners requested Judge Moffat to stay his Order pending 
an appeal. (R. 64) A copy of the Motion for Stay was mailed to 
respondent' s counsel. (R. 65) That Motion was denied and on 
September 25, 1987, petitioners perfected the instant appeal and 
filed a Motion for Stay in this Court, which was also mailed to 
respondent' s counsel. This Court entered an Order of Stay of 
Execution pending a hearing on petitioners' Motion for Stay, 
which was scheduled for hearing on October 17, 1987. No response 
to petitioners' Motion for Stay was filed and the matter was 
stricken from the Court' s calender. 
On September 30, 1987, respondent filed a proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order, which were 
intended to encompass the ruling set forth in both of Judge 
Moffat's minute Orders. (R. 93 & 100) Petitioners promptly 
objected to the form of the Order (R. 105). Acknowledging the 
importance of expediting the matter, petitioners' counsel offered 
to resolve the objections in a phone conference between Judge 
Moffat and the parties' counsel. (R. 103) Respondent' s counsel 
did not respond to petitioner's objections. Consequently, on or 
about October 14, 198 7, petitioners moved this Court for an Order 
delaying the filing of the docketing statement until a final 
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order was entered in the District Court. That Motion was granted 
on or about October 16, 1987. 4 
On or about December 3, 1987, without contacting 
petitioners' counsel regarding petitioners' objections, 
respondent' s counsel submitted another set of proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment to the 
District Court. (Addendum "K") The documents were not mailed to 
petitioners' counsel of record as required by the Rules of 
Practice in the District Court. (See mailing certificates on 
pleading attached as Addendum " K" ) Nonetheless, they were 
executed and entered by the District Court on December 3, 1987. 
Upon discovery of the entry of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order, petitioners refiled 
their Objections thereto and set the Objections for hearing on 
January 15, 1988. (Addendum "L"). Upon request from respondent's 
counsel, petitioners agreed, at the last minute, to continue the 
hearing on their Objections to February 5, 1988. (See Addendum 
"M" and "0") However, because neither party appeared at the 
hearing on January 15, 1988, the District Court dismissed 
petitioners Objections. (Addendum "N"). 
The record hereinafter cited by petitioners is either 
found in the record in the Court of Appeals or is part of the 
record of the District Court made after the index on appeal was 
transmitted to the Court of Appeal, which has not as of this 
writing, been numbered for reference. To avoid confusion, all 
district court documents submitted after the index on appeal was 
drafted are attached as addenda. Petitioners apologize for the 
fact that the need to attach these documents as addenda has made 
this brief somewhat voluminous. 
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Consequently, petitioners were forced to file a Motion to 
Vacate Ruling, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
and Judgment. (Addendum "0" ) That Motion was heard on February 5, 
1988 at which time counsel for the respondents acknowledged his 
errors and the District Court held that respondent had violated 
the Rule of Practice requiring that the pleadings be submitted to 
opposing counsel. (Addendum " P" ) The District Court heard the 
objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment and Order and penned in modifications which are 
reflected in the copies attached hereto as Addendum " K" 
Petitioner' s counsel prepared an Order reflecting the District 
Court' s ruling and submitted the Order to respondent' s counsel 
for approval. Respondent' s counsel has not, at the time of this 
writing, either returned the Order to petitioners or filed it 
with the court. Consequently, petitioners have prepared a 
duplicate original Order (Addendum " P" ) and submitted it to the 
trial court. 
As a result of the multiple complications, this appeal is 
being processed and this brief submitted although the matter has 
not been fully concluded by the District Court. The child, now 
approximately nine months old, remains in the petitioners' 
custody. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
One judge cannot reverse the decision of another co-equal 
judge. That rule governs unless it results in a manifest 
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injustice. In this case, the respondent filed a motion for 
relief from Judge Murphy' s ruling and the only facts offered in 
support of that motion are contained in respondent' s affidavit, 
in which she directly contradicts the testimony that she gave 
before Judge Murphy. Under these circumstances, a manifest 
injustice occurred when respondent was not required to bring her 
motion before Judge Murphy. Consequently, Judge Moffat erred by 
reversing Judge Murphy' s ruling that respondent had voluntarily 
relinquished her parental rights and consented to the child' s 
adoption. 
POINT II 
Once consent to adoption is duly executed and accepted 
before a court in conformity with the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-30-8 (1987), it cannot be revoked absent a 
finding that the consent was procured through fraud, undue 
influence or misrepresentation. In the instant case, the trial 
court did not find that respondent' s consent was procured by 
fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. Further, the record 
is devoid of any facts that would support such a finding. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in allowing respondent to 
revoke her consent to the adoption. 
In addition, a trial court cannot make determinations of 
fact based upon conflicting affidavits. The only evidence before 
the trial court in this case was the affidavits submitted by the 
parties, which directly contradicted one another. Consequently, 
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the trial court erred in ruling on the factual issues raised by 
those affidavits without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT X 
ONE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE CANNOT REVERSE THE RULING OF ANOTHER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE. CONSEQUENTLY, JUDGE MOFFAT ERRED IN 
OVERRULING JUDGE MURPHY' S HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT' S CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION WAS VOLUNTARILY GIVEN. 
Embedded firmly in Utah law is the edict that, absent 
extraordinary circumstances, one district court judge cannot 
reverse the ruling of another district court judge. See e, a. 
Conder v. Williams & Ass' n, 739 P. 2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) ("a court should not reconsider and overrule a decision 
made by a co-equal court."); State v. Saunders, 699 P. 2d 738, 
740 (Utah 1985); Peterson v. Peterson. 530 P. 2d 821, 823 (Utah 
1974); State v. Morgan. 527 P. 2d 225, 226 (Utah 1974); Tanner v. 
Meacham fin the Matter of Meacham). 537 P. 2d 312, 314 (Utah 
1975)("one judge of one division of the same court cannot act as 
an appellate court and overrule another such judge") 
The evolution of that edict has been accredited to the need 
to "avoid the delay and difficulties that arise when one judge is 
presented with an issue identical to one which has already been 
passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same case." Conder, 739 
P. 2d at 636 citing Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil. Inc. , 692 
P. 2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984) Equally supportive of the need for 
judicial restraint where an issue has been ruled upon by another 
co-equal judge is the possibility that, absent such restraint, 
any time parties were unsatisfied with the ruling of a trial 
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court there would be a temptation to redirect the problem to a 
new judge in hopes of obtaining a more desirable ruling. Such a 
state of affairs would be unacceptable. Thus, it is well 
established that an unhappy litigant cannot attack the ruling of 
one district court judge by applying to another district court 
judge for relief therefrom. "If a person feels aggrieved by one 
judge's doings he may attack such conclusion in a proper 
[proceeding -different than bringing a motion for relief before a 
co-equal judge-] usually by the extraordinary writ route." State 
v. Morgan, 527 P. 2d at 226. 
The maxim that one district court judge cannot reverse 
another is not without exception. When the rule would work a 
manifest injustice, such as where it is impossible to bring the 
matter before the judge who made the initial decision there may 
be a meritorious argument for allowing another judge to address 
the issue. See Daly v. Sprague. 742 F. 2d 896, 900 (5th Cir. 1984) 
Moreover, the rule does not bar another judge from hearing a 
subsequent motion on an issue of law that has already been 
decided if the case is presented in a "different light," such as 
where additional discovery has revealed new facts. Richardson v. 
Grand Central Corp. . 572 P. 2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) Neither 
exception applies to the instant case. 
In this case, the issue of whether respondent was 
voluntarily relinquishing her parental rights and consenting to 
her child' s adoption came before Judge Murphy in the hearing 
required by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-8. In that hearing 
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respondent testified, in no uncertain terms, that she understood 
the meaning and implication of the Affidavit Relinquishing 
Parental Rights that she was to sign. She testified that she 
believed her actions to be in the best interest of the child and 
that she was relinquishing her parental rights freely and 
voluntarily, without force from anyone and in accord with her own 
decision, a decision that she had adhered to "all along." She 
testified, not once but twice, that she was not on any medication 
that impaired her ability to make a knowing decision and to 
understand her actions. She acknowledged that she understood the 
finality involved and that she knew that she would have no 
further rights to the child. 
After hearing this testimony and observing respondent' s 
demeanor, Judge Murphy allowed respondent to execute the 
Affidavit Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to 
Adoption and held, specifically, that her "consent was given with 
the knowledge that by the execution of the consent she thereupon 
relinquished all parental rights as well as parental 
responsibilities in and to the child. " Based upon that holding 
the child was released from the hospital to the petitioners' 
custody. 
Thereafter, the respondent brought a Rule 60(b) Motion for 
relief from Judge Murphy' s ruling. In that Motion she directly 
attacked the Judge' s finding that her consent had been knowingly 
and voluntarily given. In support of her Motion, respondent 
submitted an affidavit expressly contradicting the testimony she 
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had given before the court. Specifically, respondent attested: 
(1) that she had not understood the meaning or implications of 
her relinquishment of parental rights or the finality of that 
relinquishment but "was informed and believed" that her consent 
could be revoked for six months after the consent was executed; 
and (2) that, in any event, she had significant doubts about 
consenting to the adoption at the time the consent was executed 
and would not have signed the Affidavit Relinquishing Parental 
Rights had she not been under the influence of medication and so 
weakened by the birth that she was left without the strength to 
properly evaluate the matter. 
Certainly this affidavit did not bring the issue into a 
"different light." The facts at issue were exactly those that 
were explored by Judge Murphy. The only "different light" shed 
on the hearing before Judge Moffat was created by respondent' s 
affidavit, which directly contradicts her prior testimony. 
Certainly a party cannot earn an opportunity to have an issue 
decided by another judge simply by altering his or her testimony 
in a manner that they believe will change the new judge's ruling. 
Moreover, under these circumstances, requiring respondent to 
bring her motion for relief from judgment before the judge that 
rendered the judgment does not work a manifest injustice, it 
avoids one. Justice is not served by allowing respondent to 
rescind the testimony given before one judge by submitting 
contradictory testimony to another judge. At minimum, respondent 
should be asked to face the judge to whom she initially testified 
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and convince that judge that he erred when he accepted her 
initial testimony as true and released the child to the 
petitioners. 
Judge Moffat held that the parties waived the right to have 
the Motion to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Adoption heard by Judge Murphy because, although the 
matter was discussed at the time of the hearing, "neither party 
expressed a desire to have Judge Murphy preside." (Addendum " K", 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at paragraph 9) 
Petitioners have been unable to find any authority for the 
proposition that such a right can be waived and common sense 
dictates that it cannot. The rule that one trial court cannot 
reverse another is based upon "sound policy considerations, " 
including the need to avoid the difficulties and delays inherent 
in allowing one co-equal judge to overrule another. Conder v. 
Williams, 739 P. 2d at 636. The need for efficient, consistent 
administration of a case dictates that litigants adhere to the 
rule. It is not uncommon that the parties on both sides of an 
issue are not wholly satisfied by the ruling of a judge. Are they 
then allowed to present the issue to another co-equal judge so 
long as neither express a desire to have the first judge hear 
the issue again? If so, the policy behind the rule would be 
effectively undermined. 
In summary, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
consistently held that it is reversible error for a trial court 
overrule the decision of a co-equal court. See e. a. Condor v. 
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Williams. 739 P. 2d 634; State v. Saunders, 699 P. 2d 738, 740 
(Utah 1985). In this case, when Judge Moffat found that 
respondent did not voluntarily relinquish her parental rights and 
consent to the adoption of her child, he reversed Judge Moffat' s 
prior ruling that respondent had acted voluntarily. Consequently, 
Judge Moffat's ruling should be reversed and his Order allowing 
the respondent to revoke her consent should be vacated. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO REVOKE HER 
CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD, ON THE BASIS OF HER 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE AND WITHOUT HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, 
A. The District Court erred in allowing respondent to 
revoke her consent based upon her unilateral mistake. 
Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that Judge Moffat 
could entertain respondent' s Motion to Set Aside Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree although the issues to be 
decided therein had already been determined by Judge Murphy, the 
question remains: Under these circumstances, did the trial court 
err in allowing respondent to revoke her consent? 
In resolving that question, "this Court may review the 
evidence and make its own findings" as "this proceeding is 
equitable (sometimes said to be so in the highest degree)". In 
re: Adoption of F, 488 P. 2d 130, 133 (Utah 1971). 5 
Furthermore, this Court is in as good a position as the 
District Court to evaluate the evidence as the only evidence 
before the District Court was the affidavits of respondent, her 
doctor and her counselor, which are attached as addenda to this 
brief. 
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Section 70-30-8 of the Utah Code requires that the party 
relinquishing his or her parental rights must go before a Court 
and consent to their child' s adoption. That statute serves two 
purposes. First, it allows a Court to assure, to the highest 
possible degree, that the consenting party is acting voluntarily 
and knowingly. As importantly, it protects adoptive parents from 
the pain that is caused when party decides to withdraw their 
consent to the adoption. When the requirements of Section 78-30-
8 are met "there is a presumption of regularity . . . which does 
not necessarily attach to a consent privately given. " In re: 
Adoption of K. 465 P. 2d 541, 543 (Utah 1970); S3& e. a. In the 
Matter of S. 572 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1977). In fact: 
Although there is no specific statutory provision 
prohibiting a change of mind and revocation of a 
consent by a parent executing before a Court, such a 
proviso is unnecessary. 78-30-8 . . . certainly 
indicates that a consent so executed would be valid and 
binding. Under such circumstances the Court should be 
able to judge whether the consent should be given and 
whether it is given freely and voluntarily. 
In the Matter of S, 572 P. 2d at 1373 citing In re the Adoption of 
D, 252 P. 2d 223, 230 (Utah 1953). 
Thus, under Utah law, once a Court has accepted the consent 
of a party relinquishing his or her parental rights, which 
necessarily requires a finding that such consent is knowingly and 
voluntarily given, that consent cannot ordinarily be revoked. 
The only exception to that rule is that: a consenting party 
may be allowed to revoke his or her consent if they can show that 
it was "induced through duress, undue influence, or under some 
misrepresentation or deception; or other grounds which would 
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justify release from the obligations of any contract". In the 
Matter of S. 572 P. 2d 1374; In re: Adoption of K, 465 P. 2d at 
542. 
A trial court commits reversible error if, after the child 
has been placed with adoptive parents, the court allows a party 
to revoke consent to the adoption without finding that the 
consent was obtained through fraud, undue influence or 
misrepresentation. See In re: Adoption of K, 465 P. 2d at 542. 
Judge Moffat made no such finding. Instead he based his 
conclusion that respondent' s consent was not voluntarily given 
upon a finding that the respondent was not "clearly apprised" of 
the finality of her consent and was "confused and indeed believed 
that though she signed the consent, she would still have six 
months" in which to revoke her consent. The fact that Judge 
Moffat did not find that there was no fraud, undue influence or 
misrepresentation is not surprising as the record is totally 
devoid of evidence that would support such a finding. Judge 
Moffat apparently based his conclusion upon respondent' s 
statement that she was "informed and believed" that the consent 
was not final for six months. Nowhere does respondent state who 
informed her that the relinquishment was not final or where she 
received such information. In fact, the Affidavit of Susan 
Bagley states that respondent was told by Lincoln Hobbs, 
petitioners' attorney, that her relinquishment would be final 
upon signing of the document. Susan Bagley, who has extensive 
experience counseling women who are contemplating placing their 
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children for adoption, also stated that she had several 
conversations with the defendant in which they discussed the 
finality of the signing of the consent. 
Moreover, respondent was given a copy of the Affidavit 
Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption prior to 
the time that she signed the document. Respondent had the burden 
of understanding the document she was to sign. See Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985). 
Indeed, respondent testified that she had read the document and 
that she did understand it. The document speaks in present 
terms; it states: "I hereby relinquish all of my parental rights 
which exist to and with Infant Anonymous. " Judge Murphy 
specifically asked if respondent understood the finality 
involved. Respondent stated that she did and that she understood 
that she would have no further rights to the child. 
Consequently, the record in this case indicates nobody 
misrepresented the consequences of signing the consent to 
respondent. In fact the petitioner' s attorney, respondent' s 
counsel and the judge tried to assure that respondent understood 
the finality involved. The only misrepresentation that is 
evidenced in the record is that of the respondent in testifying 
that she understood the implications of signing the consent, 
which she now claims she did not. The weight of the law holds 
that a party cannot revoke consent simply by alleging that they 
did not understand the seriousness or finality of executing the 
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consent. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 P. 2d 806, 899 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1975); Batton v. Masser, 369 P. 2d 434, 437 (Colo. 1962). 
The only other finding offered in support of Judge Moffat' s 
conclusion that the mother did not knowingly consent to the 
relinquishment of her parental rights was the fact that she did 
not consult with "members of her immediate family, including her 
own mother" until after the birth of the child. Judge Moffat 
noted that he was "impressed" by this fact. That reaction is 
contrary to the law in this State. The legislature has 
determined that consent to adoption is valid, without the 
approval of the consenting party' s parents, even if the 
consenting party is a minor. Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-30-
4(2) (1987). If a minor is not required to consult with her 
family before relinquishing parental rights, it necessarily 
follows that an adult need not consult with her family. In this 
case, at the time consent was given, the respondent was at least 
21 years of age. Whether or not she spoke with her family prior 
to consenting to the adoption is simply irrelevant. 
Thus, because the trial court did not find that respondent' s 
consent was procured through fraud, undue influence or 
In her affidavit in support of her motion to set aside 
Judge Murphy' s ruling, respondent alleged that she had been on 
medication which impaired her ability to understand her actions. 
That allegation was controverted both by her prior testimony and 
by the affidavit of Dr. Jones who stated that the medication 
prescribed to respondent would not impair her ability to 
understand her actions. Neither the Minute Entry reflecting 
Judge Moffat' s ruling nor the Findings of Fact drafted pursuant 
to that ruling indicate that Judge Murphy found that medication 
was a factor in this case. 
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misrepresentation, and because the record is devoid of facts that 
would support such a determination, the trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, by allowing respondent to revoke her consent to 
the child' s adoption. 
B. The Court erred by determining issue of fact based 
\ipQn conflicting <=tf fidftvitg. 
Respondent' s motion to set aside Judge Moffat' s ruling was 
supported only by her affidavit. In response to that motion, 
petitioners filed two affidavits containing facts which directly 
contradicted those set forth in respondent' s affidavit. No 
further evidence was offered by either party. In essence, each 
party stood by the statement of facts found in the affidavits 
they submitted and asserted that, based upon those facts, they 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law - rendering the 
proceeding the functional equivalent of a motion for summary 
judgment. 
It has long been established that a Judge cannot summarily 
determine questions of fact on the basis of conflicting 
affidavits. Where a question of fact exists, a trial is required 
in order to allow the Judge to evaluate the demeanor of the 
witnesses. See e. a. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P. 2d 64, 65 (Utah 
1984); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright 
& Miles Chartered. 681 P. 2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). Yet, in 
order to rule in favor of the respondent, Judge Moffat purported 
to resolve the issues of fact created by the conflicting 
affidavits in favor of respondent. Such a resolution directly 
violates the rule that a court cannot make factual determinations 
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based upon conflicting affidavits. Consequently, Judge Moffat' s 
ruling should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, petitioners 
herein respectfully request that this Court reverse the ruling of 
the trial court and reinstate petitioners' Petition for Adoption. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jfK*- day of March, 1988. 
VJtttoA. DAVTEF ST_DOLOWlTZ 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 24, 1987 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the : Case No. A-87-229 
Adoption of: 
4 8 : REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
INFANT ANONYMOUS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 24th day of June, 
1987, the above-entitled action came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge 
in the Third Judicial District for the State of Utah, 
and was reported by me, Gayle B. Campbell, a Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For Petitioners: Lincoln W. Hobbs 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
FILEO IN (>. 
Ski"' -• 
/HJG -7 1987 
GAYLE 3 CAMF-cai :~! °'c':- ^ n "I 
CPSriflfc-, CHORTHAND RP = ORTEff 6 / ^ - J M V Y U ? ' 
->nr u*E C|rY< UTAH (I \ 
1 Salt Lake City, Utah June 24, 1987 
2 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
I THE COURT: This is in the matter of the adoption 
1 
I of Infant Anonymous, Case No. A-87-229. Lincoln Hobbs 
4 A 
Jon behalf of the petitioners is present before the court, 5
 I 
1 along with the natural mother. Mr. Hobbs, why don't you 
6 1 
J go head. Let's have the mother sworn in, and you put 
7
 I on what you believe is necessary. 
8 I MR. HOBBS: I have brought before the court 
today , who had an infant female born 
at the Holy Cross Hospital yesterday morning at about 
5:00 o'clock, or 4:19 a.m. She is before the court to 
give her consent to the adoption of her infant child, 
and I have met with her in the hall and provided her with 
a copy of the document which she will be signing, the 
affidavit relinquishing her paternal rights. She has 
read the same and she indicated to me she understands 
the same. If you would like to ask her any questions 
respecting the knowing consent on her behalf. 
THE COURT: Let me see your affidavit. 
MR. HOBBS: It's among these documents. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
9 
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having been duly sworn, was examined and testified on 
her oath as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Mr. Hobbs has indicated that 
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you have read this affidavit. Is that true? 
A Yes, I've read it. 
Q And you are 
A Yes. 
Q And you are the natural mother of the child 
in questionf who was born on June 23, 1987. 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Why is it that you think it's in the best 
interest of the child that you relinquish any rights you 
|have and consent to the adoption? 
A I just cannot take care of her financially. 
Q Do you understand — for want of a better 
word — the finality of this? That if it goes forward, 
that you relinquich all parental rights forever. 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And you are doing this freely and voluntarily. 
A Uh huh. (Affirmative) 
Q No one has forced you to do this. 
A Nobody has. It's my own decision. 
Q Did you see that child after the child 
was born. 
A Not right after she was born, but I did 
later that day. I've been down there three times. 
Q Did you make up your mind to relinquish 
your parental rights after you had seen the child? 
A What do you mean? I've decided all along 
to have this adoption go through, and I know that there 
will not be any rights for me to --
3 
1 II THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hobbs, is there 
2 g anything that needs to be a matter of record and under 
a 1 oath for the Order to be signed? 
MR. HOBBS: I would just have two matters 
| I would want on the record. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOBBS: 
Q Are you under the influence of any drugs 
8 i that may impair your ability to make a knowing consent 
9 
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at this time? 
A No/ I'm not. 
MR. HOBBS: The other thing I would like 
on the record, I would like the record to reflect that 
I have brought a certificate of search for acknowledgment 
of paternity by the father. As of 9:01 a.m. this morning 
there have been no acknowledgment of paternity. 
THE COURT: All right. , why 
don't you go ahead and sign that affidavit. Fill in the 
datef the 24th day of June, and sign it on the table there. 
(Document signed) 
THE COURT: Are you taking any pain medication 
now? 
| THE WITNESS: Just for my stitches. 
THE COURT; All right. And that doesn't 
interfere with your ability to --
THE WITNESS: No, it doesn't. 
Q -- know and understand what you're doing 
here. 
1 THE WITNESS: No, 
2 J THE COURT: All right. The affidavit having 
I been signed, and having heard the testimony, it's appropriate 
I that the Order as submitted be signed, and I'll do it 
4 8 
| at this time. All right. 
5 | 
I Good luck to you. 
6 I 
1 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
S t a t e o f U t a h ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, do hereby certify that 
I am a Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah; 
That as such reporter, I attended the hearing 
of the foregoing matter and thereat reported in stenotype 
all of the testimony and proceedings had; that thereafter, 
| my notes were transcribed into typewriting under my direction, 
and pages 1 through 5 constitute a full, true, and correct 
report of the same. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah thisf-^ day 
of August, 1987. 
GAYLE fc I. CftMPBELL, R.P.R 
My Commission Expires: 
6 January 1988 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY 
Dennis V. Haslam (#1408) 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
F,Lcg?'NCl-eRK'S OFFICE bolt Lake County Utah 
AUG 24 1987 
H. D,xon Hmd'cvOprt 3rd Dist. Court 
By S^&M^ 
^/Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY 
Case No. A-87-229 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Susan Bagley, having been duly sworn, does depose and 
state that: 
1. I am a counselor, employed by the Utah Women's Health 
Center, with various responsibilities in counseling patients 
of the Center, including the counseling of pregnant women who 
have made a decision to place a child for adoption. 
2. 1 have a bachelor of science degree in Behavioral 
Science and Health from the University of Utah, and am Assis-
tant Director of the Utah Women's Health Center. 
3. I have, in the medical records of my patient, 
, a signed and notarized Consent to Release of 
Personal and Medical Information which authorizes me to re-
lease to Winder & Haslam and to allow them to inspect and ob-
tain copies of any and all of "personal or medi-
cal records, bills, notes, x-rays and medical reports pertain-
ing to [her] phsyical or mental condition, past, present or 
future, upon a presentation of this consent or a photocopy 
thereof." 
4. I first became acquainted with on or 
about March 31, 1987, when she came to the Utah Women's Health 
Center to determine the duration of her then-existing preg-
nancy, was at that time, and continues to be to 
the best of my knowledge, unmarried. She is 21 years of age. 
5. Following initial consultation with me 
at the Center, I met with and counseled her on several occa-
sions for a total of 12y hours respecting her decision to 
place her child for adoption. 
6. During the course of my counseling of , I 
did not advocate the option of adoption over any other of the 
alternatives available to her in her situation. 
7. During the course of my counseling of 
she continually affirmed that her desire respecting her preg-
nancy was to place her child for adoption, and that an adop-
tion would be in the best interests of her child, as she was 
unmarried and did not have the means to support the child. 
8. At no time during my counseling of did 
she express any reservations respecting her decision to place 
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the child for adoption, other than the natural and expected 
feelings of ambiguity in such a situation, 
9. After reached the final decision to 
place the child for adoption, we arranged an appointment and 
visited with Lincoln W. Hobbs, attorney for petitioners here-
in, and discussed the possibilities of a private adoption of 
her then unborn child. On or about June 5, 1987, at approxi-
mately 11:00 a.nu, and I met with Mr, Hobbs at 
his office at the law firm of Winder & Haslam. 
10, During that meeting, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs 
advised that: 
a. He would be paid by and acting as attorney for 
the petitioners herein, and as such could not provide any 
legal advice to He further advised her that 
should she have a legal question, she should direct the same 
to independent counsel, as he had an apparent conflict of in-
terest in advising her of her legal rights. 
b. He further told her that it would be necessary 
for her to visit with and sign a consent in the presence of a 
judge, and that following her signature on that consent, her 
rjghts to the infant would be terminated, and she could not 
thereafter change her mind and obtain custody of the child. 
11. Following that meeting, I had several other conversa-
tions with in which we discussed the finality of 
a decision she was to make respecting relinquishment of her 
child for adoption. 
12. On June 22, 1987, I was notified that 
had gone into labor and was expected to deliver at Holy Cross 
Hospital. I met her at the hospital and sat with and assisted 
her through labor and delivery of her child. 
13. During a long labor, repeatedly stated 
her wishes to have the baby as soon as possible so she could 
return to her home and her "normal" lifestyle. During the 
labor, she waivered as to whether she wanted to know the sex 
of her child or whether she would want to see her child after 
its delivery. 
14. At no time during labor did she ever express any res-
ervations about her decision to place her child for adoption. 
15. On or about June 24, 1987, approximately 30 hours 
after the delivery of her child, and I met with 
Mr. Hobbs at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, prior to an appointed, scheduled meeting with 
Judge Michael R. Murphy of that Court, for the purpose of ob-
taining consent to the adoption and relinquish-
ment of her parental rights. 
16. At that time, and in my presence, Mr. Hobbs provided 
with, for her inspection, a copy of an Affidavit 
Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adoption and 
asked her to review the same. 
17. In my presence, read the Affidavit. 
Following her reading of the Affidavit, Mr. Hobbs asked 
-4- 0000 -< 
if she understood the contents of the document. 
stated she did- Mr. Hobbs told her that, in the 
presence of the judge, she would most likely be read a copy of 
the consent, asked if she understood the contents, asked if 
she understood her relinquishment would be a final decision, 
and would further be asked if she were under the influence of 
any drugs which might affect her ability to make a decision. 
18. Thereafter, Mr. Hobbs, and I proceeded 
to the chambers of Judge Michael R. Murphy, at which time, in 
the presence of a court reporter, signed the Af-
fidavit Relinquishing Parental Rights and Consenting to Adop-
tion. 
19. Following the taking of consent in the 
judge's chambers, she and I went to lunch together in Salt 
Lake City. For approximately 2 hours we talked about her 
decision and about how she could now return to her normal ac-
tivities. During our lunch, she appeared in full control of 
all of her mental facilities, and did not appear to be unduly 
tired or affected by stress. 
20. During the course of my counseling of 
she advised me she did not desire her mother, with whom she 
resided in Lindon, Utah, to know of her pregnancy. 
21. As a result of her request, and in light of the fact 
that I found her to be a mature, intelligent and sophisticated 
woman, I respected her decision and did not at any time allow 
-5- onMG v-^ 
her mother to become aware of her pregnancy. 
22. To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, 
mother was unaware of her daughter's pregnancy 
until several days following the delivery and 
return home. 
23. Several days after the consent was given, I was con-
tacted by who advised me she had spoken to her 
mother about the pregnancy and the adoption, and that her 
mother had expressed serious reservations about her daughter's 
desire and decision to place the child for adoption. 
then advised me she had "changed her mind" with re-
spect to the consent she had provided in the presence of Judge 
Michael R. Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County. 
24. Since that conversation with , I have had 
no further contact or communication with her. 
DATED this _^W_ d aY o f August, 1987. 
Susan Bagley 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /? '' day of Au-
gust, 1987. ^
 y S 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing in Salt Lake County, UT 
1AMU. 
-S-t-S Z- ^0^,S^y , ^-/-/s •'/ 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that 1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN BAGLEY to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, this y^ day of August, 1987, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney for 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
W\CV: OCOw 
ADDENDUM "C" 
AFFIDAVIT OF CYNTHIA A. JONES, M.D. 
Dennis V. Haslam (#1408) 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
AUG 24 1987 
H. Dixon H-.i-cy.GteA 3rd Dipt. Court 
°y — T ^ /SputyCterk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CYNTHIA A. 
JONES, M.D. 
Case No. A-37-229 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cynthia A. Jones, M.D., having been duly sworn, does de-
pose and state that: 
1. I am a physician, licensed and in good standing to 
practice medicine in the field of obstetrics in che State of 
Utah. 
2. I have, in the medical records of my pacient, 
, a signed and notarized Consent to Release of 
Personal and Medical Information which authorizes me to re-
lease to Winder & Haslam and to allow them to inspect and ob-
tain copies of any and all of "personal or medi-
cal records, bills, notes, x-rays and medical reoorts pertain-
ing to [her] phsyical or mental condition, past, present or 
P.*N") 
future, upon a presentation of this consent or a photocopy 
thereof,M 
3. was a patient of mine from June of 1987, 
through the delivery of her infant child on June 23, 1987, at 
Holy Cross Hospital, Salt Lake City, State of Utah, 
4, I have reviewed my medical records files for 
and am familiar with the contents therein. 
5- The medical records of indicate that 
following her child's delivery on June 23, 1987, she was pre-
scribed Tylenol #3 and no other medications for treatment of 
her pain. It is my medical and professional opinion that the 
drugs prescribed and administered to during and 
following delivery would not have adversely affected her abil-
ity to make an informed and knowing decision respecting the 
relinquishment for adoption of her child and release of paren-
tal rights on or about June 24, 1987, at approximately 10:30 
a.m. 
6. As part of my obstetrical practice, I deal on a fre-
quent basis with unmarried and expectant women. When treating 
these women, it is my custom and practice to assure the women 
are aware of all possibilities respecting their pregnancy, 
including adoption, retention of the infant, and their rights 
to medical termination of the pregnancy. I do not, nor did I 
to in this instance, encourage any alternative 
over another. 
-2- ^nJy\''-'1 
7. Also, as a customary and habitual practice in my pro-
fession, I will note in my medical records any statements or 
indications of hesitancy on the part of a woman who has pre-
viously indicated a desire to place her child for adoption. 
Furthermore, in the event of such concern, I always recommend 
a woman consult with a counselor or seek professional help 
regarding her decision, 
8. In reviewing my medical records for , I 
have found no indication this patient, at any time during my 
treatment of her over the course of her pregnancy, indicated 
any reservations about her stated intention to place this 
child for adoption. 
9. During my treatment of , I was informed 
and aware of the fact she was being counseled by Susan Bagley 
of the Utah Women*s Health Center respecting her decision. 
10. Throughout my treatment of , I do not 
recall at any time, up to and after the time of delivery, the 
patient indicating any hesitation whatsoever about her deci-
sion to place the child for adoption. 
DATED this <pV day of August, 1987. 
Cy;3%hia A. Joner^/ M. D. / 
rtOflO^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this c£/ day of Au-
gust, 1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
/NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, UT 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CYNTHIA A. JONES, M.D. to be 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, this Jr~] day of Au-
gust, 1987, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney for 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
AFFIDAVIT RELINQUISHING PARENTAL RIGHTS 
AND CONSENTING TO ADOPTION 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
Dennis V. Haslam (#1408) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
FILED IN CLERK'S OVi'lCt-
Salt Lake Couni•: built 
JUN 241987 
ir.diey. O." : 3rd Oist. Court 
Uop-.'iy Cli 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
AFFIDAVIT RELINQUISHING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND 
CONSENTING TO ADOPTION 
Case No. fl^n-an 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states that: 
L. 1 am the natural mother of a minor child, born out of 
wedlock on June 23, 1987. 
2. Because I have not the sufficient means to properly 
care for said child, and because I feel the child's best in-
terests will be served, I hereby consent to the adoption of 
the child by adoptive parents represented by Lincoln W, liobbs 
and Dennis V. Haslam, for adoption pursuant to Utah law and 
with all the rights and obligations therewith. 
3. I understand that this adoption proceeding will be 
conducted without my being informed of the identity of the 
adopting parents. 1 have consented and agreed to this means 
of adoption, and hereby consent to the adoption of my child by 
the individuals represented by Lincoln W. flobbs and Dennis V, 
Haslam. 
4. I hereby relinquish all of my parental rights which 
exist to and with Infant Anonymous, a minor, born June 23, 
1987, at Holy Cross Hospital, Salt Lake County, Utah, herewith 
affirming that I am the natural mother of the child; and I 
expressly consent to the adoption of the child by persons ap-
pearing before the Court, with full knowledge that by so doing 
I forfeit each and every right which might otherwise exist 
with reference to the custody and parental relationship of the 
child. 
5. I have read the foregoing affidavit and I fully un-
derstand the impact of the terms and conditions to which I 
have agreed and consented, and my action herein taken is of 
my own free will, executed voluntarily without any coercion, 
force or duress, and without any promises of any kind whatso-
ever, except that the best interests of the child will be 
served by the adoption. 
DATED this ^^ day of June, 1987. 
WITNESS 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judqe 
A H E 6 T 
H. DIXON HiNOLEY 
{ CLERK 
nV ^jJkL\AAA 
ii 'teouty C!e(L v 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
C E R T I F I C A T E OF S E A R C H 
FOR A C K N O W L E D G M E N T OF PATERNITY BY FATHER t^n.^-i 
Name of Mother 
Place of CMd£<0\Hh 
^ I t v l & k e C i t y , Utah 
Dale of Child s Birth 
June 2 3 , 1987 
Sex of Child 
Female 
* #ftfsAf£ to certify that a search has been made of the records of ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY BY 
^fRT^THER filed with the State Office of Vital Statistics and no record was found to be on file 
,-\ 
n IV - . CPU 
^ r ^ f . i ^ t f** a m June 24, 1987 
°
 K ft,SV-^ DATE m 
v
 Ir-an^A^knowledgment of Paternity by Father is found on file a certified copy \ i l lbe^vsued If no record is on file a 
G^RTfgCATE OF SEARCH is issued ^ ^ 
UDH OVR 23 Revised 7/86 ooat^'S 
ADDENDUM "E" 
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO ADOPT AND FOR TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
Lincoln W. flobbs (#4848) 
Dennis V. HasJam (#1408) 
WTNDFR & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
JON 2 3',387 
7± 
a>-
13 ^  IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO ADOPT 
AND 10R TEMPORARY CUSTODY 
Case No- j~p~ Q/ ^<9\^J7 
Petitioners and 
respectfully represent and show: 
1. Petitioners are husband and wife and reside at 
, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, are over the age of 21 years and are more than 10 
years older than the minor child named in this petition. Thus 
Court has jurisdiction over this adoption pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-30-7. 
2. rlhe subject of this adoption proceeding is a female 
rrunor child, to-wit: Infant Anonymous who was born June 23, 
1987, at Holy Cross Hospital, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Coun-
ty, Utah, and who is in newborn infant care at lhat hospital. 
3. The natural mother of said child is not and has not 
been heretofore married to the putative father of the child. 
KW: n'*~ 
4. The putative father's consent to the adoption is not 
required under the laws of the State of Utah by reason of his 
marital status or conduct. 
5. Petitioners desire to adopt the child and fully un-
derstand the legal implications of an adoption, 
6. Petitioners, and each of them, desire to perfect 
adoption of Infant Anonymous and stand ready to execute the 
necessary consent agreements in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
7. Petitioners are fit and proper persons to have cus-
tody of and to adopt the child; and it is reasonable and prop-
er that the adoption be granted and that the Court preliminary 
thereto deprive the natural mother permanently and judicialJy 
of any rights in relation to the minor child pending a final 
adoption proceeding as required by law. 
8. Petitioners and 
are 36 and 31 years of age, respectively; they have been 
married for over five (5) years and have one other child, age 
4. is a fire fighter and paramedic for Salt Lake 
County. is an emergency room nurse at Holy Cross 
Hospital in South Jordan, Utah. The have an approx-
imate annual income of $50,000.00 and are both active in a 
Christian church. 
9. The home of pelil Loners Ls a suitable and proper home 
to rear the child and petitioners are morally fit and finan-
4. The putative fatherfs consent to the adoption is not 
required under the laws of the State of Utah by reason of his 
marital status or conduct. 
5. Petitioners desire to adopt the child and fully un-
derstand the legal implications of an adoption. 
6. Petitioners, and each of them, desire to perfect 
adoption of Infant Anonymous and stand ready to execute the 
necessary consent agreements in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
7. Petitioners are fit and proper persons to have cus-
tody of and to adopt the child; and it is reasonable and prop-
er that the adoption be granted and that the Court preliminary 
thereto deprive the natural mother permanently and judicially 
of any rights in relation to the minor child pending a final 
adoption proceeding as required by law. 
8. Petitioners and 
are 36 and 31 years of age, respectively; they have been 
married for over five (5) years and have one other child, age 
4. is a fire fighter and paramedic for Salt Lake 
County. is an emergency room nurse at Holy Cross 
Hospital in South Jordan, Utah. The have an approx-
imate annual income of $50,000.00 and are both active in a 
Christian church. 
9. The home of petitioners is a suitable and proper home 
Lo roar the child and petitioners are moraLly fit and finan-
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cially able to support and educate the child and to have the 
care, supervision and training of the child, and petitioners 
desire to adopt said child and to make the child their own in 
a]l respects as authorized by law, including the rights of 
inheritance. The welfare of the child will be served and the 
child's best interests promoted by such adoption, 
10. Petitioners request that the temporary and immediate 
custody of the child be placed with petitioners as soon as 
possible and that Holy Cross Hospital be ordered to release 
the child to petitioners' custody. 
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray: 
1. That the Court proceed to a determination of this 
adoption and that the natural parents be permanently and ju-
dicially denied any rights in relation to the minor child and 
that in full compliance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
the petitioners be granted a decree of adoption and the child 
from that time forth be known by the surname of petitioners. 
2. For an Order placing with petitioners the temporary 
custody of the minor child. 
3. For such other and further relief appropriate in the 
premi ses. 
DATED this day of June, L987. 
WJNIJER & HAS LAM 
By:. <- ^ 
Li ndfiln W. l lobbs 
A t t o r n e y s Cor P e L i U o n e r s 
• 3 -
(l(h Lt 4 
& 
DATED 2D this X. ~> day of June, 1987. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The petitioners above named, being first duly sworn under 
oath, depose and say that they have each read the foregoing 
Petition, know the contents thereof and that the same are true 
to their own knowledge except as to matters set forth on in-
formation and belief, and as to those matters they believe the 
same to be true. 
4^ On the ^ da. of June, 1987, personally appeared be-
fore me and , signers of 
the foregoing Petition, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
( sXs 
_J^X_ 
C:::H^OT-A;ffY P 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
s/o/lo 
ADDENDUM "F 
ORDER 
Lincoln W. Hobbs (#4848) 
Dennis V. Haslam (#1408) 
WINDER & HASLAM 
J 75 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
JUN 241987 
H Dixon h . -
B y „ -
ZrA Court 
ClerkQ i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
ORDER 
Case No. fi-27'237 
The above-entLtied matter came on for hearing before the 
Court on application of Lincoln W. Hobbs, attorney for Peti-
tioners. The Court reviewed the verified petition of the par-
ties and was fully satisfied in the premises. Now for good 
cause shown and pursuant to the allegations of the verified 
petition: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §70-30-7 in that the adoptive parents reside 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. The petitioners in this cause are fit and proper per-
sons to be granted and are hereby granted the lemporary caro, 
custody and control of lnlant Anonymous, born June 23, J987, 
to , dt Holy Cross Hospital, with express 
'joo':' 
instructions that petitioners should provide aJl necessary 
care and support for the child pending further Order of this 
Court, 
3. Holy Cross Hospital is hereby authorized and directed 
to release the child to Lincoln W. Hobbs or Dennis V- Haslam, 
as attorneys for the adoptive parents, who have been approved 
by this Court, upon presentation to the hospital of a certi-
fied copy of this Order. The Court herewith acknowledges the 
consent of the natural mother, given before this Judge in ac-
cordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-30-8, to the adoption of the 
child, and further notes that the mother's consent was given 
with the knowledge that by the execution of the consent she 
thereupon relinquished all parental rights as well as parental 
responsibilities in and to the child. The father of the child 
has not filed an acknowledgment of paternity. 
4. The adoption file commenced herein shall be sealed 
for all purposes except to be opened upon further Order of 
this Court for further proceedings herein. 
DATED this 2 V (3ay of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Cour t Jud'ge / 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
^x/ CLERK 
By —h&^j^Ssz 
Deputy Clerk 
Oc-
~
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ADDENDUM "G" 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE AND MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACTS, ORDER AND DECREE 

RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
FILED IN CLERICS OFFiCc 
Salt Lake County Utah 
JUL 221987 
H.Dixon^nbiey.CI^ 3rd 0«st. Court 
Vl^Kl/^ //- ity* —-
By —r 1 ' ' '' cWuty Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF: 
Infant Anonymous, 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND DECREE 
Case No. AXH~^*) 
COMES NOW and moves this Court pursuant 
to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an Order 
setting aside the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Adoption and allowing the movant, to 
withdraw her consent to the adoption. 
There is attached hereto and incorporated herein a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987. 
ICHARD B. JOHNSON 
Attorney for Movant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the ^ ^ ^ day of 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the fo^ Hbgoigj^ , postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V. Haslam 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
$Jh<mML ^i^Amud 
RICHARD B, JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
TILED if i CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt La.ce County Utah 
JUL 22 1987 
(i Dixon h'noic:, CAe-\ 3rd Dtst Court 
deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF: 
Infant Anonymous. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
ORDER AND DECREE 
Case Number: / ^ ^ ^ A ^ f 
COMES NOW , by and through her attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson, and submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of f Motion 
to Set Aside Findings of Fact, Order and Decree, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I! 
THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY HAS 
JURISDICTION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF THE RELIEF SHE REQUESTS. 
In adoption cases the courts are given broad discretion to 
formulate a decree which is equitable and consistent with public 
policy. The Supreme Court of Utah in, 
D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547, 551 (1967), 
<;<*(}'; > ^ 
quoting prior case law said: 
. .the important phrase of the case is that it recognized 
the right of a natural mother to revoke written consent, and 
as pointed out, when the question of undue influence is an 
issue "the court should carefully scrutinize the evidence 
lest an honest, worthy and well-meaning natural parent be 
unjustly depraved of her child." 
Therefore, the courts not only have jurisdiction to hear the 
facts and make a decision, but the courts are also held to a high 
level of scrutiny to protect the rights of the natural mother to 
be with her child. 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated in 
In Re Adoption of F 488 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1971): 
. .The mother of an illegitimate child has the right both 
to its custody and to relinquish that right if for any 
reason she so desires. If she so decides and freely and 
voluntarily signs a release and consent for adoption, it is 
binding the same as any other contract. It is, of course, 
true that if no rights or interests of third parties have 
intervened, the courts are quite liberal in permitting the 
withdrawal of such a consent. 
The fact that did not understand and 
freely and voluntarily consent to the adoption of her daughter 
along with the fact that petitioner forthwith moved the Court 
within a few days to regain her daughter should weigh heavily in 
movantfs favor. 
-2-
POINT II 
THERE ARE LEGAL GROUNDS WHICH JUSTIFY THE 
REVOCATION OF THE PETITIONER'S CONSENT TO ADOPTION. 
The standard for revocation of consent to adoption is set 
out in In the Matter of S.r 572 p.2d 1370, 1374 (1977): 
A duly executed consent can be avoided only be showing the 
agreement was not entered into voluntarily but was induced 
through duress, undue influence, or under some 
misrepresentation or deception; or other grounds which would 
justify release from the obligations of any contract. 
It seems quite clear that petitioner signed the consent from 
with the belief that she had six months before the adoption was 
final and during that period of time she could revoke her 
consent. The belief that consent was not final as of June 24, 
1987, was based on the representations and statements. When one 
applies the standard set out above, the consent agreement should 
be revoked based on the fact that there was a misrepresentation 
and the petitioner signed the agreement with the justifiable 
deception that she could regain custody of her daughter at any 
time within the next 6 months and while she was under the 
influence of pain medication. 
In addition to misrepresentation, the persons involved 
exercised undue influence. The essence of undue influence is 
-3-
unfair persuasion. See In Interest of Perry, 641 P. 2d 641, 181 
(Wash, App., 1982), 
The ultimate question is whether the result was produced by 
means that seriously impaired the free and competent 
exercise of judgment. Such factors as the unfairness of the 
resulting bargain, the unavailability of independant advice, 
and the susceptibility of the person persuaded are 
circumstances to be taken into account in determining 
whether there was unfair persuasion, 
1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 177, comment b at 491 
(1981). 
Certainly the petitioner's judgment, at the time she signed 
the consent, was impaired by the drugs taken and the 
representations that there was a six month period before the 
consent agreement was final. 
Additional light is shed on the issue by the court in 
In the Matter of Anderson, 589 P.2d 957 (Idaho, 1978). The 
standard the court applied in the case was whether the consent 
was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, and with full 
awareness of the legal consequences. Movant does not meet any of 
these requirements. She was relying on the misrepresentations of 
the effect at the consent. She was in no position to make a 
intelligent decision regarding the permanency of her consent. 
-4-
Similar issues to the ones raised in this case were 
addressed by the Washington Court of Appeals in 
In Interest of Perry, 641 P.2d 178 (1982). The mother of an 
illigitimate child received aid from an agency. As a result of 
the advice of her physician and the agency she signed a consent 
agreement. The court further stated: 
During that time everyone advocated that she place her child 
for adoption. She was never clearly informed by the agency 
that even though it had spent money on her behalf, she was 
nonetheless free to retain her child and return to Michigan. 
She was not encouraged to consider alternatives and had no 
opportunity to reflect or seek independant advice. Although 
she was told the relinquishment was final, she was also 
improperly advised that another mother changed her mind 7 
months after relinquishment and recovered her child. 
.Additionally, she challenged her relinquishment 
immediately upon returning to Michigan. The findings further 
show this environment created in Miss. Perry's mind an 
obligation without option, to repay the agency's expenses by 
relinquishing her rights to the child. In view of these 
findings, the close relationship that must have developed 
and Miss Perry's dependancy upon the agency, we hold the 
court's conclusion must stand and the relinquishment be set 
aside. 
In light of the above case, petitioner should be allowed 
relief. In the Washington case as well as the case at issue the 
mothers were not fully informed by the agencies of their rights. 
Neither mother was encouraged to seek legal advice. Both mothers 
-5-
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were faced with outside pressures from their family. The agency 
lead both mothers to believe that there was a period of time 
after signing the consent that they could regain their children. 
Therefore, just as the consent was revoked in the case cited 
above so also should the petitioner be released from her consent. 
POINT III 
NOT ALLOWING PETITIONER TO REVOKE HER CONSENT TO 
ADOPTION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY 
The Supreme Court of Utah state in 
D P v. Social Service & Child W. Dept., 431 P.2d 547 (1967): 
I take it that most everyone will agree that there is a 
strong presumption that a baby is better off with its 
natural mother; that such presumption must be overcome only 
by clear and convicting evidence; that even though a written 
consent is given her it is revocable under certain 
circumstances. 
• • .The ties by which a mother and child are bound together 
should not be severed except for grave and weighty reasons. 
The fact that this child may receive, at the hands of 
appellants, a better home that respondent can provide, is 
not sufficient reason for depraving her of her offspring. 
The natural affection which accompanies a child and her 
mother is a relationship which should be securely protected by 
the courts. Public policy dictates that children should not be 
severed from their mother unless it is the clear intention of the 
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mother to do so. The court in the above cited case stated that 
even though the mother was destitute and had no means of 
providing for the child, and that the adoptive parents could more 
adequately give the child the necessities of life, there still 
existed insufficient grounds for awarding custody to the adopting 
parents. Id. at 552. 
CONCLUSION 
therefore respectfully requests the Court to 
revoke the consent agreement and allow her child to be returned 
to her. 
DATED th is 22nd day of July, 1987. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON^ 
A t t o r n e y f o r Movan t 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the J^^- day of 
Pit i §AA/ / 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
Dr^foing/ p the fo eg ostage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V, Haslam 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
lUiwdfr l^utP^WMs^ 
-8-
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ADDENDUM "H 
AFFIDAVIT 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
•riLED IN CLERK'S 0FFK;h 
Salt Lake County Uian 
JUL 22 1987 
M. Dixon HlndU- C j ^ 3rd DM. Court 
By —j&l— ~ jfcputy Clerk" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF: 
Infant Anonymous. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. A ffl'SO-*! 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• < 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
, after first being duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am the natural mother of the child involved in this 
matter. 
2. I signed the attached Affidavit relinquishing parental 
rights and consenting to adoption. 
3. At the time I signed that Affidavit, I had been on pain 
medication. Prior to going to the Court, I had significant doubts 
about giving the child up for adoption. I believe that the pain 
oooo"1 
medication together with the stress that I was under because of 
childbirth simply left me without sufficient will and strength to 
properly evaluate that matter, 
4. After I left the hospital and got my strength back, I was 
resolute that I did not want to lose my child and wanted the 
rights to raise the child. I believe that had it not been for the 
medication and stress of childbirth, that I would have indicated 
to the persons involved that I did not want to give my child up 
for adoption. 
5. I do not have monies to fight this matter legally, and it 
took me the time from June 24, 1987 to to the time that I hired 
Richard Johnson to raise sufficient monies to be able to file the 
appropriate documents with the Court to request that the consent 
to set aside and that the Decree of Adoption be set aside, 
6. Aside from the medication and stress, I was informed and 
believed that the Decree of Adoption did not become final for six 
months and that I had that period of time in which some action 
could be taken. I do not understand that the giving of my consent 
and the signing of the Affidavit were the end of the matter and 
that there was in fact a period of time that could change my 
mind. 
oooo-z 
7. I want very much to raise my child and have my parental 
rights restored. The child means everything to me and I would 
greatly appreciate the assistance of the Court in allowing me to 
have my rights with the child restored. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 1987. 
Movant 
SUBSCRIBED & SWORN to before me this day of 
, 198 . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: RESIDING AT: 
Q(J0Q£3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
hereby certify that on the <^yQ day of 
1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
th6/foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V. Haslam 
WINDER & HASLAM 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
fcfatMolQL &7BukmfJh) 
oooo 
ADDENDUM "I" 
MINUTE ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1987 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. A-87-229 
The Court having considered the pleadings on file herein, 
together with the Affidavits and argument of counsel, hereby 
grants the Motion of to withdraw her consent 
to the adoption of her natural child known herein as Infant 
Anonymous, who was born June 23, 1987 at Holy Cross Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Court recognizes that any decision that it makes in this 
matter is going to be emotionally disturbing to one or the other 
of the parties herein. The Court is convinced, however, that a 
reading of the transcript of the proceedings at which the natural 
mother's consent was taken is not inconsistent and, in fact, 
implies that her consent is not final, and that the proceedings 
would have to "go forward." While the Court does not find fault 
with the judge that took the consent, when the language used 
therein at that time, jjfc. is considered in view of the allegations 
of the natural mother that she was told that the adoption would 
not become final for six months, which she took to mean that she 
could withdraw her consent at any time during that six month 
period, it becomes apparent that she probably did not knowingly 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
consent to the release of her parental rights on an unconditional 
basis. The language involved is found on lines 11, 12 and 13 of 
page 3, where the Court said, MDo you understand — for the want 
of a better word — the finality of this? That if it goes 
forward, that you relinquish all parental rights forever." 
(Emphasis supplied). 
The Court is further impressed by the fact that the natural 
mother did not consult with members of the family, including her 
own mother, until after the birth of the child, but was consulted 
only by a counselor at the Utah Women's Health Center. Again, 
not in any way to impune the capacity or capability of the said 
counselor, nevertheless, the natural mother, after consulting 
with her own mother, decided that she wanted her child back, and 
as evidence thereof, within three days after the consent had been 
taken (which was taken about 3 0 hours after the birth), she 
advised the counselor that she wanted the child back. She 
thereafter filed the Petition herein as soon as possible in view 
of her financial conditions, which was within 3 0 days of the date 
that she had given the consent. 
Under the circumstances, it is the Court's opinion that the 
mother did not freely and voluntarily given an unconditional 
release of her parental rights, that she was acting under a 
mistaken belief that the adoption would not become final for six 
months, and that she had the right to change her mind within that 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
six month period. The Court finds that if there was, in fact, 
less than a full, knowing, unconditional release of the parental 
rights, the equities in the matter weigh in favor of setting the 
consent aside, and the Court so orders. 
The Court further orders that custody of the child be 
returned forthwith to the natural mother. The natural mother is 
ordered to repay to the adoptive parents the reasonable costs 
they have incurred in this matter. She may have a period of two 
years to pay those costs in equal monthly installments. 
The natural mother's attorney will prepare the Order. 
Depbty Clerk 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE FOUR MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this A*°^ day of September, 1987: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V- Haslam 
Attorneus for Petitioners 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
51 r " 
ADDENDUM "J" 
MINUTE ENTRY DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1987 
FILED IN CLARK'S OFFICE 
Gaft Lake County Utah 
SEP 25 1987 
" °
, X O n H
^ Clerk 3rd 0.st Court 
-^—
l [
 ^r^ ^ f t r 
Jspuiy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO- A-87-229 
The "Protective Motion for New Trial, Or, in the 
Alternative, Amendment from Judgment or Relief From Judgment" of 
the petitioners in the above-entitled matter came on for hearing 
before the Court on September 23, 1987. The Court heard 
argument, and has carefully examined the Memoranda and cases 
cited to it by counsel for both the petitioners and the natural 
mother, and now denies the above-described Motions. 
The reason for said denial is that while the matter should 
perhaps have initially been heard by the judge that took the 
consent, this Court discussed that matter with counsel for the 
parties at the time of the initial hearing herein, and neither 
party expressed a desire to have the judge who took the consent 
hear the matter. In addition, the matter was submitted on 
Affidavits and oral argument, without any request for the entry 
of additional evidence. It is the Court's opinion that had the 
parties asked either to have the original judge hear the matter, 
or have an evidentiary hearing, both of said motions would have 
been granted. However, having not done so, this Court is of the 
opinion that those matters have been waived. It has been urged 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
that the question of having the matter heard by the judge who 
took the original consent cannot be waived. However, this Court 
is of the opinion that is not a correct statement and that, in 
fact, such waiver did take place herein. Therefore, this Court 
rules as above set forth, and the provisions of the Minute Entry, 
dated September 1, 1987, will remain in full force and effect. 
The Court orders that the custody of the child be returned 
forthwith to the natural mother. The natural mother"s attorney 
will prepare the Order. JX 
Dated this _day of S 
#IC$fckD/ft<s^foFFAT 
DISTRICT 0OURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By K ty\pf?,(Yto 
Deputy Clark 
000088 
INFANT ANONYMOUS PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this ^ ^  day of September, 1987: 
Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Petitioners 
185 S. State, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
& &r*£ffAh 
000QG3 
ADDENDUM "K" 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
' '-cO /«, -
" ^  Or-r 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS, 
Defendant-
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l N o . A - 8 7 - 2 2 9 
This matter having come on for hearing before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat on the 31st day of August, 1987. 
The natural mother was present and represented by her attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not present nor 
represented by their attorneys Lincoln W. Hobbs and Dennis V. 
Haslam. The natural mother having filed a Motion to Set Aside 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Adoption in this matter and to withdraw her Consent and the 
parties having submitted affidavits and memoranda in support of 
their position and having argued the matter before the Court 
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and submitting to the Court for decision based upon the 
memoranda and affidavits and in addition, having considered 
Petitioner's protective Motion for New Trial or in the 
alternative amendment from judgment or relief from judgment 
which came on for hearing before the Court on September 23, 
1987. The natural mother was again present and represented by 
her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not 
present but were represented by their attorney, David S. 
Dolowitz. The Court, having carefully examined the memoranda, 
affidavits and arguments presented by counsel and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that is in fact 
the natural mother of a minor child born out of wedlock on June 
23, 1987. 
2. The Court finds that on June 24, 1987, that the natural 
mother, , appeared before Judge Michael R. 
Murphy and was questioned concerning the Consent. 
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3. The Court finds that the natural mother was not clearly 
apprised of the finality of signing the Consent. Specifically, 
the Court finds that the natural mother was confused and indeed 
believed that even though she signed the Consent, she would 
still have six months, during which time the Decree of 
Adoption, would not be final and at any time during that six 
month period she could withdraw her Consent. 
4. The Court finds that the natural mother did not 
knowingly consent to the release of her parental rights on an 
unconditional basis. 
5. The Court finds that the natural mother did not consult 
with members of her immediate family including her own mother 
until after the birth of the child and that the only 
consultation received by the natural mother was from a 
counselpr at .the Utah Women's Health Center.4>^£JR-** A * * ^ ^ * ^ V » 
' 6. The Court /finds that after the natural mother had 
consulted with her own mother that the natural mother decided 
she wanted her child back and within three days advised the 
counselor that she wished to withdraw her Consent. 
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7. The Court finds that a Petition to withdraw the natural 
mother's Consent was filed as soon as practical in view of her 
financial condition which was accomplished within 30 days of 
the date she had given consent. 
8. This Court finds in response to Petitionees Protective 
Motion for New Trial or in the alternative Amendment from 
Judgment or Relief from Judgment that this Court discussed the 
matter of whether the case should be heard by Judge Murphy who 
originally took the Consent of the natural mother and finds 
that neither party expressed a desire to have Judge Murphy hear 
the matter. 
9. The Court finds that since neither party expressed the 
desire to have Judge Murphy preside that said parties waived 
that right. 
10. The Court finds that the Protective Motion for New 
Trial or in the alternative Amendment from Judgment or Relief 
from Judgment was submitted on affidavits and oral argument 
without any request for the entry of additional evidence and 
further finds that the parties waived their right to offer any 
additional evidence by neglecting to make said request. 
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11. The Court finds that the natural mother did not make 
an informed knowing unconditional release of her parental 
rights and is entitled to revoke her Consent. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Consent to adoption is hereby set aside and the 
adoptive parents are ordered to return the minor child to the 
natural mother forthwith. 
2. The right to have Judge Murphy who took the original 
Consent preside over these proceedings has been waived by the 
parties to this action. 
3. The right to offer additional evidence relative to 
these proceedings has been waived by the parties by their 
failure to timely asseft said ^ ighVl 
DATED this ~<* <3ay of No^embe^rr 1987. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
the foreqoi 
hereby certify that on the 3^ day of 
, 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
g ng, postage prepaid, to: 
Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V. Haslam 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Cfluu^, ^.Krf^iyj. 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, #1722 
Attorney for Movant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. A-87-229 
This matter having come on for hearing before the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat on the 31st day of August, 1987. 
The natural mother was present and represented by her attorney, 
Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not present nor 
represented by their attorneys Lincoln w. Hobbs and Dennis V. 
Haslam. The natural mother having filed a Motion to Set Aside 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Adoption in this matter and to withdraw her Consent and the 
parties having submitted affidavits and memoranda in support of 
their position and having argued the matter before the Court 
and submitting to the Court for decision based upon the 
memoranda and affidavits and in addition, having considered 
Petitioner's Protective Motion for New Trial or in the 
alternative amendment from judgment or relief from judgment 
which came on for hearing before the Court on September 23, 
1987. The natural mother was again present and represented by 
her attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The adoptive parents were not 
present but were represented by their attorney, David S. 
Dolowitz. The Court, having carefully examined the memoranda, 
affidavits and arguments presented by counsel and the Court, 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now 
makes and enters the following: 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1„ The natural mother, ^ , Notion to^ 
Set Aside A Firftdingc ^ of Fact, /Conel-usinafi-s-of Law and-Decro4 of 
Adoption is hereby granted. 
2, The Consent of the natural mother in this matter is 
hereby set aside. 
3- The adoptive parents are hereby ordered to return the 
minor child to the natural mother forthwith. 
4. Petitioner's Protective Motion for New Trial or in the 
alternative amendment from judgment or relief from judgment is 
hereby denied, 
', 1987. DATED this *J day of. 
"y Ck 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the ^?c/^ day of 
jf]h\\PjfY\V\^T / 1987, I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoir foregoing, postage prepaid, to: 
Mr. Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Dennis V, Haslam 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
ADDENDUM "L" 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
AND 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (08 99) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
oau Lci^- CcLnly Utah 
JAN 7 -1933 
H Oixon Hindley, C^rK 3rd Disc Court 
By _,' :;,:; / ' * / * 
Oeootv C<erk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. A87-229 
Judge Moffat 
* * * * * 
The adoptive parents of Infant Anonymous hereby move 
the above-entitled court to withdraw the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered by the court 
on the 3rd day of December, 1987, on the grounds that, 
contrary to Rule 2. 7 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
Courts of the State of Utah, no copy of the proposed Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Order and Judgment were 
transmitted to counsel for the natural parents prior to their 
submittal to the court. Examination of those documents will 
demonstrate that, on the 24th day of November, 1987, they were 
mailed to Lincoln W. Hobbs and Dennis V. Haslam, attorneys for 
petitioners. Lincoln W. Hobbs and Dennis V. Haslam withdrew as 
counsel for the adoptive parents on the 3rd of September, 
1987, and David S. Dolowitz entered his appearance as counsel 
of record for the adoptive parents on the 4th day of 
September, 1987, and communicated that to Richard B. Johnson, 
attorney for Movant. Thereafter, David S. Dolowitz appeared 
in the hearing held before the court on September 23, 1987, at 
the hour of 8: 30 a. m. , yet, Richard B. Johnson did not 
transmit copies of the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law or Order and Judgment to David S. Dolowitz but, rather, 
sent them to Lincoln V. Hobbs and Dennis Haslam who did not 
forward them to David S. Dolowitz until late in December, 
1987, at approximately which time David S. Dolowitz learned 
from Judge Moffat' s clerk that they had been entered. 
Having examined the purported Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, petitioners object to Finding of Fact No. 
3, Finding of Fact No. 4, Finding of Fact No. 5, Finding of 
Fact No. 6, and Finding of Fact No. 7 on the grounds that 
there was no trial where evidence was presented and these 
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matters could be determined. Petitioners object to purported 
Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9 and 10 as those are, in reality, 
conclusions of law, and are not appropriate, based on the 
findings that can be made in the status of this case and 
purported Finding of Fact No. 11 as this is a conclusion and 
there has been no evidentiary hearing upon which this could be 
determined. 
Petitioners object to No. 1 of the Order and Judgment 
on the grounds that such pleadings were never entered. 
DATED this / day of January, 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
-3-
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
true copy of the above and foregoing Objection, this f day 
of January, 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
and a true copy of the above and foregoing mailed to: 
Mr. Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South #4004 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668. 
4 &^^r( 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
-4-
F LZD v. CL. 
S^ st L V , Ccon.y Utah 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
JAN 7 -1983 
H Dixon Htndley, Dark 3rd Dtst Court^  
By 
Oeput/ C'srk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Civil No. A87-229 
Judge Moffat 
* * * * * 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing on Petitioners' 
Objections to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order and Judgment heretofore entered in the above-entitled 
matter will be held on Friday, January 15, 1988, at the hour 
of 9: 00 a. m. or as soon thereafter as this motion may be 
heard, before the Honorable Richard A. Moffat at the District 
Courts Building, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111. 
DATED th »i_ day of January, 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a 
true copy of the above and foregoing Notice of Hearing, this 
/ day of January, 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
and a true copy of the above and foregoing mailed to: 
Mr. Lincoln W. Hobbs 
Attorney at Law 
175 West 200 South #4004 
P. O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ~ZJ 
ADDENDUM "M" 
NOTICE OF CONTINUANCE OF HEARING 
DAVID S, •yy.OWITZ 
of ana tor 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT % SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Su. ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84] C2 
Telephone: {p "* , * * -
j£^ti^ A^^*4 
IN THE THIRD 
"b ( » UTAH 
^AK* COUNTY 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INF ANT 1 iNONYMC". 
NOTICE Or CONTINUANCE 
c
 HEARING 
C i v i ^ NV\ A 6 7 
J u d g e Mof f at' 
PLEASE TAKE NOT.* CI"! t h a * M ; G h e a r i n g ~« P e t i t e 
or,n : ,i~i . ~ n.1-
m a t ^ ^ r n i ' R v i o u : ; i v s c h ^ d . ^ 1 ^ d : 
:id 
; ~ 1 i d 
r i ci a y u a.< ^ a * •< 
• - -- ~" - * - -
 r ^ o p h ^ ^ i i p Q ^nd : - v, - •: :. o r 
F n d d v , r t i l i l U a j . - - " IT . 
t h e r p ^ f t e r a s ; h : s ; T..)r;.- f: ma;, or- '\e i r : e e l ; r^ L., ,! :.*.;:. e 
*" * --* * *"
 r , ,
-
c t n
 ' - ' n u r t . s H ' . i l d m q , 24- E a s t 
4 0 0 c :ouL. t , .^c. - ;iiLiriUctiice was 
at the request of counsel for the natural mother, Richard B. 
Johnson. 
DATED this (H day of January, 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true copy of the above and foregoing Notice of 
Continuance of Hearing, this // day of January, 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
-A*-
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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ADDENDUM "N" 
MINUTE ENTRY DATED JANUARY I S , 198 8 
Minute Book Form 103 I niHU t i u u i u i A L v ia i M I U i 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
— r — ,-Plamnff , ^ ' 
CASE NO: /? - 21- i^r 
Type of hearing: Div. Annul. 
Present: Pltf. , Deft._ 
P.Atty: T)« "DcPjoto/V^ u/P 
Supp. Order. OSC. Other, 
D. Atty: fl £>- 3 ^ k ^ x M / p " 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf: Deft: 
Others: 
Summons. 
Waiver 
Stipulation. 
Publication. 
ofPIt 
SLUXLr 
RICHAR $t 
D Default  Pltf/Deft Entered 
Date: 
Judge: _ 
Clerk: 
Reporter: 
Bailiff: _ 
/<P, W ? 
MOFFAT 
KATHY GROTEPAS 
HAL WALTON f O / P 
ORDERS: 
D Custody Evaluation Ordered 
• Visitation Rights 
• Custody Awarded To 
n 
• 
n 
n 
n 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $ x 
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $ 
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:. 
Atty. fees to the 
Home To: 
_ 
_ Per Month/Year 
_ in the amount of _ 
Per Month 
• Alimony Waived 
• Deferred 
• Furnishings To: 
• Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
Automobile To: 
• 
• 
• 
• Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_ 
• 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
G Divorce Granted To 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
Restraining Order Entered Against 
As 
• Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry 
• Former Name of 
• 3-Month Interlocutory 
. Is Restored 
D Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft. 
Returnable Bai l . 
• Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
[M Based on writton Gtipulation of respective QC eouncol/motion af-Plaintiff'scounsel, court orders 
y"J¥? 
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ADDENDUM "0" 
MOTION TO VACATE RULING, FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
JAN 26 1983 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF ) MOTION TO VACATE RULING, 
THE ADOPTION OF: ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
) ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
INFANT ANONYMOUS. ) Civil No. A8 7-22 9 
) Judge Moffat 
* * * * * 
The petitioners in the above-entitled matter hereby 
move the court to vacate its ruling of January 15, 1988, 
denying their motion to vacate the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered in this 
matter on the 3rd of December, 1987, on the grounds that the 
procedure of the court has denied due process of law to the 
petitioners and has violated the Rules of Practice of the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah contrary to 
the ruling of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
Biaelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P. 2d 50, 52 (Utah 1980), followed in 
Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P. 2d 116, 117 (Utah 1983) as follows: 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and 
Judgment entered by the court on the 3rd day of December, 
1987, were entered without compliance with Rule 2. 9 of the 
Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit Couirts of the 
State of Utah, when copies of the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Order and Judgment were not transmitted to 
counsel for the petitioners yet were entered by the court. 
When the failure to comply with the Rule 2. 9 in violation of 
Biaelow v. Inaersoll, supra, became known to counsel for the 
petitioners, he immediately filed a Motion to Vacate the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment 
and scheduled the matter for hearing before the Court on 
January 15, 1988. Counsel for the natural mother called the 
office of counsel for the petitioners on several occasions 
requesting that the hearing be vacated as counsel for the 
natural mother could not attend a hearing before the 5th day 
of February, 1988. Counsel for the natural parents, desiring 
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to have this matter resolved as soon as possible, declined to 
continue the hearing until he was assured that, under no 
circumstances, could counsel for the natural mother attend the 
hearing nor could any counsel on behalf of the natural mother 
in the office of counsel for the natural mother attend a 
hearing scheduled on the 15th of January, 1988. At that 
point, as a matter of professional courtesy which has been 
stressed repeatedly to the attorneys in practice in the State 
of Utah by both the judges of the Third Judicial District 
Court and the judges and justices from the Court of Appeals 
and the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, agreed to extend 
that professional courtesy to counsel for the natural mother 
and continued the hearing to February 5, 1988. The secretary 
for counsel for petitioners thereupon called the judge's clerk 
to advise Judge Moffat of this procedure on January 14, 1988, 
but was advised that the clerk was attending a seminar, so 
left a message that the continuance had been accepted by 
counsel for petitioners and the appropriate notice would be 
prepared and filed. 
On the morning of January 15, 1988, counsel for the 
petitioners received a call from Judge Moffat' s clerk, 
advising him that his Motion had been denied as Judge Moffat 
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will not continue any matter after noon on Thursday, prior to 
the Friday Law and Motion Calendar. There is no published 
rule of the Third Judicial District Court or the Rules of 
Practice of the District and Circuit Courts or is there any 
place that could be discovered by counsel for the petitioners 
that such a rule exists. Counsel for the petitioners had 
continued the hearing as a matter of professional courtesy to 
counsel for the natural mother, whose conduct in violating 
Rule 2. 9 of the Rules of Practice of the District cind Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah is the issue that was to be 
presented to the court. The petitioners' conduct does not 
form any basis for the action of the court in denying the 
Motion of the petitioners without giving the petitioners an 
opportunity to be heard. 
DATED this 2 2 day of January, 1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ ^ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true copy of the above and foregoing Motion, this 
_2^-day of January, 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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ADDENDUM "P" 
ORDER REGARDING MODIFICATION OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE ADOPTION OF: 
INFANT ANONYMOUS 
ORDER REGARDING 
MODIFICATION OF 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. A87-229 
Judge Moffat 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding, on Friday, the 5th day 
of February, 1988, to consider the objections of the adoptive 
parents to the proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Order and Judgment that had been accepted by the court and 
entered on December 3, 1987. Counsel for the natural mother 
agreed that Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah had not been followed 
in this matter and agreed that it was appropriate for the 
court to consider the objections of the adoptive parents. The 
court then heard and considered the specific objections and 
ruled that the objection to Paragraph 1 of the Order and 
Judgment should be sustained, and, by interlineation, deleted 
the language "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree 
of Adoption," and inserted the language "Order of Temporary 
Custody filed and dated June 24, 1987." 
The court then considered the objections to the 
Findings of Fact and the court, examining the objection to the 
proposed Finding of Fact No. 3, determined that, although the 
adoptive parents objected to proposed Findings of Fact No. 3 
on the grounds that there had been no trial and this could not 
be determined as a question of fact, there were conflicting 
affidavits, to-wit: those of Dr. Cynthia A. Jones and Susan 
Bagley, opposing the affidavit of the natural mother, and 
Judge Michael Murphy had made a determination directly 
contrary to this determination, the ruling of the court 
necessarily encompassed this finding and it was appropriate. 
The objection was overruled. On the same basis, the court 
overruled the objections of the adoptive parents to Findings 
of Fact, Paragraph 4, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 7 and Paragraph 
11. The court determined that the objection should be granted 
in part as to Paragraph 5 and by interlineation at the end of 
the existing provision, the court added the language ". . . 
and the consultation set forth in the affidavit of Cynthia A. 
Jones, M. D. " 
The objections of the adoptive parents to Paragraphs 8, 
9 and 10 were withdrawn. 
Having thus ruled on the objections and by 
interlineation made the corrections that the court deemed 
appropriate to make, the court now ratifies, and by means of 
this order, confirms its entry of the the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment as thus modified, 
as previously entered on December 3, 1987, to the extent that 
the objections of the petitioners are inconsistent with this 
ruling, they are overruled. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULING OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Petitioners 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
Attorney for Natural Mother 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true copy of the above and foregoing Order, this 
day of , 1988, to: 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
-#~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four copies of 
the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief, this 11th day of 
March, 1988, to: 
Richard B. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Respondent 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
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- 27 -
